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INTRODUCTION 
The lower court made three fundamental errors in this case. First, it failed to find 
a mental state that fits the "knowing" requirement of § 76-6-505(1). This is fatal to the 
conviction under that subsection of the statute. 
Second, it failed to include one of the two essential elements of the statute, namely 
the requirement that the checks be issued for the purpose of obtaining something of value 
(which includes services). Mr. Hopkins gained nothing, as the prosecution, itself, 
admitted. R. 184:201-202. He issued checks in payment of services previously rendered 
to Cornerstone Publishing. The services rendered to the corporation represented a pre-
existing debt at the time the checks were issued. To avoid problems with a State 
Constitution that forbids debtor's prison, the "obtaining" language must not be construed 
in the alternative as the lower court did. 
Third, the lower court did not recognize Mr. Hopkins' disclosure to the employees 
as a voluntary termination defense under § 76-2-307, but only as an admission of some 
kind of knowledge. Under the facts shown in the record, this was a complete defense, as 
the State has implied in the Appellee's Brief ("AB"). 
In addition, there are a number of constitutional problems with the statute. A Due 
Process problem is raised by the complex "obtaining" language, which has either 
confused the lower court or is so difficult to understand that reasonably intelligent, law-
abiding citizens are misled. An Equal Protection problem is raised by the fact that the 
second subpart of the statute raises issues of unfairness. As it is written, wealthy issuers 
l 
of bad checks can avoid criminal liability by paying the debt represented by the bad 
check within 14 days, while poor issuers of bad checks, regardless of their good faith, are 
prosecuted. Also, there are State Constitutional problems where it appears, as here, that 
the focus of the statute is the collection of a debt. 
The first argument relates to Mr. Hopkins' state of mind, which goes to his 
conviction under § 76-6-505(1). The second argument goes to the elements of the 
offense. Obtaining something of value (including wages) is necessary for a conviction 
under both 76-5-505(1) and (2). Likewise, the third argument, regarding disclosure to the 
employees about the problems with their checks, is a defense to conviction under both 
subsections. If this Court finds in favor of Mr. Hopkins on these defenses, it is possible 
to decide this case without reaching the constitutional issues. 
However, if the Court does not resolve the case on one or more of these three 
arguments, it must address the constitutional problems, and the State's opposition to the 
constitutional arguments is woefully inadequate. Indeed, the State provides no opposition 
whatever to Mr. Hopkins' Equal Protection argument against § 76-6-505(2). In light of 
the weakness of the trial court's findings of fact with regard to § 76-6-505(1), the State's 
failure to address the constitutional problem raised by § 76-6-505(2) ultimately means 
that Mr. Hopkins' conviction must be overturned, no matter what position is taken on the 
other issues. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT MADE SPECIFIC FINDINGS REGARDING MR. 
HOPKINS' KNOWLEDGE BASED ON ALL THE TESTIMONY, AND THOSE 
FINDINGS FALL SHORT OF THE OFFENSE. 
In its Statement of Facts, the State forgets that the trial court made specific 
findings of fact regarding Mr. Hopkins's knowledge based on all the testimony given at 
the trial In an attempt to spin the trial court's findings into something they are not, the 
State presents a one-sided picture of the testimony regarding Mr. Hopkins' knowledge. 
For example, on page 3 of the AB the State claims that Mr. Hopkins issued two 
paychecks to Julie Vanisi ("Julie") "knowing that the company bank account had 
insufficient funds to cover the checks." That statement conflicts significantly with the 
findings of the trial court, which found only that Mr. Hopkins knew "any given check 
may not be paid by the drawee." R. 184:205 (emphasis added). The fact is that Mr. 
Hopkins believed the checks would clear as a result of the regular cash flow of the 
company. See R. 184:152-153. Hence, his instructions to the employees indicating his 
anticipation that, although they may have problems, in time, their checks would be 
covered. Mr. Hopkins' testimony candidly explains the problems that caused the 
situation with the corporation's bouncing checks and describes his mental state with 
respect to the checks issued to Julie. R. 184:155-65. It is absolutely clear on the record 
and from the trial court's finding on this element of the offense that Mr. Hopkins did not 
know that Julie's checks would not clear, merely that the possibility existed. 
The State makes some outright errors in its recitation of the "facts." For example, 
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it claims that Mr. Hopkins declared bankruptcy (AB 7), when that is patently false. R. 
184:149. The State's presentation is particularly misleading with respect to Mr. Hopkins' 
understanding of the bank statements. As Mr. Hopkins' testimony indicates, the figures 
shown on the statements did not reflect what he was told regarding the momentary 
balances in the account that were given to him when he called the bank during working 
hours. Furthermore, they did not reflect significant deposits that were made. R. 184:159-
61. The banking testimony was very complex. The State admits that Mr. Hopkins 
deposited more than enough money on February 26, 2001 ($2,699.95) to cover the check 
subsequently issued to Julie, but claims that this deposit was negated by withdrawals the 
same day (AB 21). However, the fact that withdrawals were made the same day does not 
detract from the amount deposited, because the withdrawals were not deducted from the 
deposit. That is because funds deposited today constitute uncleared funds, which are not 
available on the day of the deposit. Thus, the withdrawals had to come from cleared 
funds that had previously been deposited in the account. Thus, Mr. Hopkins had valid 
justification for his belief that Julie's check would clear if it was processed through 
normal banking channels as explained in R. 184:197-98. 
All these uncertainties were taken into account by the trial court in its findings of 
fact regarding Mr. Hopkins' mental state. Although the trial court's finding 
underemphasizes Mr. Hopkins' hopes for better financial conditions and his belief that 
the checks he issued would, in fact, clear the bank,1 it accurately reflects the uncertainty 
of the situation and is not contested by Mr. Hopkins in this appeal. 
It is, however, insufficient to constitute the offense described in § 76-6-505(1). 
That is, the trial court's finding that Mr. Hopkins knew only that "any given check may 
not be paid by the drawee" falls far short of the statutory language of § 76-6-505(1). The 
State's attempt to put a spin on the trial court's finding by repeatedly misstating it using 
words that express greater certainty is misleading and disingenuous. 
II. KNOWING A CHECK "MAY NOT" CLEAR, BUT IS EXPECTED TO, IS 
INSUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION UNDER § 76-6-505(1) 
The lower court's finding on Mr. Hopkins' state of mind is very specific. It found 
that his knowledge of the problems with the bank account and his instructions to the 
employees "showed knowledge that there was a problem." Knowledge of a problem is 
insufficient under the statute, but the trial court went on to say: "And I think it's 
sufficient to show knowledge that any given check may not be paid by the drawee." (R 
184:205, emphasis added.) This equivocal finding reflects the reality of the situation and 
the fact that is was by no means certain that Julie's check would not clear the account. 
(See footnote 1, below.) Indeed, over $30,000.00 in checks and cash withdrawals (used 
to cover checks) cleared the Cornerstone account during the month of February 2001 in 
which Julie's checks were issued. R. 127, State's Exhibit 3. 
l Mr. Hopkins testified: "I thought that we had the money. I thought we would have the 
money. When we signed these, when we issued these checks, I fully believed that they 
would be - that they would be good. That they would be - if there was any problem, that 
5 
Section 76-6-505(1) describes the mental state necessary for the offense as 
"knowing it will not be paid by the drawee" (emphasis added). The State argues that the 
lower court's finding is equivalent to this, citing Utah Criminal Code § 76-2-103's 
definition of "knowingly." That definition (emphasis added) states: "A person acts 
knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." No such certainty is reflected 
in the word "may" used by the trial court in its findings, and no such certainty is 
demonstrated in the testimony cited above. Indeed, it was entirely possible Julie's checks 
would clear. 
The State cites the Montana case of State v. McHugh, 697 P.2d 466 (Mont. 1985) 
as authority for its position, but that case is entirely inapposite since the conviction 
upheld there was under totally different facts and dealt with a statute that has no 
equivalent in the Utah Criminal Code (i.e., "common scheme"). Moreover, Mr. Hopkins 
was tried for issuing two checks that did not get paid (R. 184:4). His state of mind with 
respect to those two checks is what matters on this appeal. 
The State cites State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, f 53, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 for 
the rule that "[n]o...word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if the 
construction can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the 
statute." Yet the State has no problem changing the word "will" in the statute to "may." 
The lower court's amendment of the language of the statute is clear error. So was the 
they would be taken care of through the cash flow." R. 184:158, lines 17-22. 
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judgment of the lower court. Mr. Hopkins' state of mind, as described in the lower 
court's findings of fact does not constitute the offense described in § 76-6-505(1). 
The State also cites § 76-1-106, Utah Code Ann., to rebut Mr. Hopkins's claims 
regarding strict construction, but it only quotes that section in part. Section 76-1-106 
states that the penal statutes of the State of Utah are not to be construed strictly, but it 
also indicates that they are to construed "according to the fair import of their terms to 
promote justice and to effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-
104." Section 76-1-104 (2) indicates that penal statutes are to be construed in order to 
"[d]efine adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute each offense and 
safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal." (Emphasis 
added.) Defendant has no problem with this standard rather than the standard of strict 
construction. That is because his conduct lacked the mental state that constitutes the 
offense and hence was "without fault" so that is should not have been condemned as 
criminal. 
III. THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IF INTERPRETED TO 
CRIMINALIZE INDEBTEDNESS WITHOUT MORAL TURPITUDE. 
The State does not address the arguments made by Defendant regarding the 
constitutional problem of eliminating dishonesty or moral turpitude from the offence 
entirely. Rather, the State claims that the legislative intent in passing § 76-6-505(1) was 
to prevent intentional overdrafts (AB 11). But it cites only a Florida case for that 
proposition. The Utah legislature's intent does not appear from the legislative history, 
7 
but statutes such as § 76-6-505(1) have their roots in crimes against obtaining things of 
value on false pretenses. See 32 Am.Jur.2d, False Pretenses, § 65, et seq. They were 
intended to criminalize the situation where one person obtains something from another by 
passing them a check that is known to be bad. Thus, however they evolved, bad check 
statutes like § 76-6-505(1) are aimed at protecting individuals, not institutions. 
If these statutes were intended to protect the banking system of Utah, restitution 
would logically consist of reimbursing persons for the costs they incurred as a result of 
the bad checks entering the banking system. That is, restitution would logically be paid 
to the bank, not the recipient of the bad check, and would consist of the overdraft charges 
for the checks that did not clear. The lower court's order of restitution is not consistent 
with the logic that follows from the Stale's argument as to the purpose of bad check 
statutes in Utah. Mr. Hopkins was ordered to pay the obligation represented by the 
corporation's bad checks, even though he was never civilly liable in his individual 
capacity for that obligation. If paying Cornerstone's obligations to Julie is the 
appropriate form of restitution, then Julie must have been the victim of the crime, not the 
banking system of Utah. That is consistent with the idea that the statute was originally 
intended to prevent harm to the property of individuals not banking institutions. 
Because of these origins, bad check statutes like Utah's necessarily carry with 
them an element of moral turpitude. Even though the requirement of "intent to defraud" 
2 The checks were drawn on a corporate account in payment of services rendered to 
Cornerstone Publishing & Distribution, Inc. 
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has been removed from § 76-6-505, dishonesty has always been an element of the offense 
and must remain so. That element is found in the "knowing" mental state required for 
conviction under this statute, a mental state that was clearly lacking in Mr. Hopkins' case. 
This is amply demonstrated in State v. Coffey, 564 P.2d 777, 779 (Utah 1977) where the 
court found that "when the jury was asked to determine whether appellant 'had an intent 
to defraud' the seller, it was equivalent to knowing that the check would not pass." 
Footnote 3 to this statement says: "We believe that the statutory definition of knowing 
implies intent when one is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to lead to the end 
result." 
The State, in addressing this issue, reiterates State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314 
(Utah 1983), which Mr. Hopkins himself cited in the AOB. But behavior which the 
legislature sought to criminalize in § 76-6-505 must be fundamentally dishonest the way 
the offense is defined in the statute. The requirement that the act be fundamentally 
dishonest is based on the two elements of the offense, viz., obtaining something of value 
from another person and knowing that the check given in exchange for that thing of value 
will not clear the bank. Indeed, State v. Smith, 571 P.2d 578, 581 (Utah 1977) sets forth 
these two acts as the elements of the offense. These are dishonest acts that imply intent to 
defraud. 
Thus, in order for Mr. Hopkins to be found guilty of the offense, he must be found 
to have had a certainty about the specific checks issued to Julie. He did not, as indicated 
by the lower court's findings and his testimony cited above. He must also have 
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personally obtained something of value (such as Julie's services). But again he did not, 
since the services rendered by Julie were not rendered to Mr. Hopkins but to Cornerstone, 
as the prosecution has admitted. To convict a person of a felony under these 
circumstances, when his behavior is in no way dishonest, is contrary to the fundamental 
nature of § 76-6-505 and criminalizes mere indebtedness without moral turpitude.3 
Criminalization of mere indebtedness is forbidden by the Utah Constitution (Art. 1, §16). 
IV. SECTION 76-6-505(1) REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE THAT "THE CHECK" 
WILL NOT CLEAR AND NOT MERELY THAT SOME CHECK MAY NOT 
CLEAR IF CASH FLOW DOES NOT CONTINUE AS EXPECTED. 
The State mischaracterizes Mr. Hopkins' argument on this point as follows: 
"Essentially, defendant claims that the act of writing as many checks as one wants based 
on future income while knowing that some of the checks will not clear the account is not 
a criminal offense under section 76-6-505(1)." (AB 11.) This is not Mr. Hopkins' 
argument nor does it represent either the facts of the case or the findings of the lower 
court. At most, it is an argument that could be made to the legislature, which has not 
seen fit to pass the "common scheme" portion of the Montana statute on which the 
State's argument relies. Mr. Hopkins was tried on two specific checks. Therefore, the 
State's rephrasing of his argument on how the word "it" should be construed in the 
3 The State claims Mr. Hopkins was, in fact, dishonest, citing his failure to take care of 
Julie's checks after saying that he would. But the State fails to cite Mr. Hopkins' 
straightforward explanation of that failure, which is found at R. 184:155-56, 159. 
Nothing in the lower court's findings suggests dishonesty on Mr. Hopkins part. Indeed, 
the very evidence relied on by the lower court to find knowledge (that he informed the 
employees of the problems with the checks) shows Mr. Hopkins' scrupulous honesty. 
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phrase "knowing it will not be paid by the drawee," constitutes an improper hypothetical. 
The fact that this statute reads the way it does further indicates that in passing § 
76-6-505(1) the legislature was focusing on individual behavior that harms other persons 
by depriving them of goods or services under false pretenses. In that light, use of the 
singular pronoun "it" makes perfect sense. The focus is on each check given in exchange 
for whatever is obtained from the victim in exchange for that specific check. Mr. 
Hopkins' mental state as to each specific check is the issue, and it is clear from the trial 
court's findings that Mr. Hopkins did not know that either of these specific checks would 
be bad. Indeed, as indicated above, he fully believed that the checks would clear against 
future cash flow of the company. 
V. "OBTAINING" IS A REQUIRED ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE UNDER 
BOTH SUBSECTIONS OF § 76-6-505, AND THE PROSECUTION AGREED 
THAT MR. HOPKINS NEVER OBTAINED ANYTHING. 
A. The "Obtaining" Element Is Critical Because It Distinguishes the Offense 
Described in § 76-6-505 From Payment of a Pre-Existing Debt. 
In its rebuttal to the AOB on this point, the State forgets who Mr. Hopkins is. The 
State says: "[Defendant argues that his conduct fell outside section 76-6-505(1) because 
he had already received Julies' work-services when he issued her paychecks, and 
therefore, he could not have contemporaneously 'obtained' anything at that time." AB 
15. But Julie performed no work-services for Mr. Hopkins at all. Indeed, her services 
were of no value to Mr. Hopkins personally. They were rendered to Cornerstone, a 
separate legal entity. Mr. Hopkins issued payroll checks in his capacity as an officer of 
n 
that corporation to pay employees for services rendered to the corporation, not to him. 
The prosecution agreed, saying: "What did Mr. Hopkins gain? Counsel's made a point 
about that. It's not relevant to the statute, not one of the elements. ... This is not a case 
where he did something to gain himself at someone else's loss. ... We're not claiming he 
gained." R. 184:201-02. 
The State's approach in this case ignores the distinction between obtaining 
something under false pretenses and simply failing to pay a pre-existing debt. Peterson 
Plumbing Supply v. Bernson, 797 P.2d 473 (Utah 1990), cited in the AOB, though a civil 
case, is clearly controlling on this issue, and is not addressed by the State. The court 
there dealt with the identical language in Utah Code § 7-15-1, saying, "No goods were 
obtained from PPS in exchange for the check; the items of value, the plumbing materials, 
were supplied earlier, on behalf of and at the request of Bowers." There was no 
contemporary exchange. Accordingly, there was no personal liability for the corporate 
bad check. This is the principal in Utah and other states, as indicated in the AOB. As the 
State notes, in today's market most people extend credit to the company for which they 
work. The company obtains the employee's services on an on-going basis without 
offering a contemporaneous exchange of value. In this situation, a debt is created for 
which the employee expects, eventually, to be paid. That is a pre-existing debt, and it is 
very different from an exchange of services in return for a check the issuer knows is bad. 
In the latter instance, the employee is the victim of a criminal scheme to cheat him or her 
out of the expected remuneration for his or her services. In the former instance, there is 
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no criminal or civil liability. 
When Julie's paychecks did not clear, it left her in the same position she was in 
before the paychecks were issued. She had extended credit (i.e., there was a pre-existing 
debt), and the corporation still owed her that debt. If Mr. Hopkins had never issued a 
paycheck to her, Julie would be in the same position as she is now. This raises the 
question as to whether the statute, if it is applied to this situation, is really punishing Mr. 
Hopkins for simply failing to get the corporation to pay its debt to Julie. As indicated in 
Peterson Plumbing, that is not the contemporary exchange that results in liability. As 
explained in the AOB (25, et seq.), the "obtaining" language is normally construed to 
require a contemporaneous exchange in order to avoid constitutional dilemmas. 
The State nowhere addresses this problem. All it says that Mr. Hopkins' argument 
is "nonsensical and runs contrary to legislative intent." AB 15. This is not a responsive 
argument. Mr. Hopkins' assertion is fully in line with the legislative intent behind Article 
1, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution, and if it were "nonsensical" it would not be the 
position of Utah and so many other states, as indicated by the cases cited in the AOB. 
The State's attempt to rebut this argument, therefore, should be ignored. 
B. The "Obtaining" Language in § 76-6-505 Must Be Construed as a Single 
Element of the Offense. 
The State ignores the grammatical construction of the "obtaining" language and 
gives no response to the important Utah cases cited in the AOB. The State's excuse for 
ignoring the relevant case law is that Mr. Hopkins cites civil cases rather than criminal 
13 
cases. That is simply untrue. In the AOB, Mr. Hopkins cites criminal cases as well as a 
civil case. Even so, this Court is entitled to use civil authorities that apply to a criminal 
case, and nothing in State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, f 10, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, cited by 
the State, is to the contrary. See State v. Bruce, 1 Utah 2d 136, 139, 262 P.2d 960, 962 
(Utah 1953) (citing civil authorities to support a ruling on criminal state of mind because, 
"the principle is the same"). This Court can and should use the Utah Supreme Court's 
construction of the "obtaining" language in the civil statute because it is essentially 
identical to the "obtaining" language in the criminal statute. Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989). Further, the principles 
involved are the same. The interpretation proposed by Mr. Hopkins is consistent with the 
Utah Supreme Court's findings in both Slate v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 
1986) and State v. Pfannenstiel, 22 Utah 2d 31, 448 P.2dd 346 (Utah 1968), which are 
both criminal cases cited for this point in the AOB. 
The "obtaining" language cannot be read in the alternative. To do so ignores the 
fact that there is no comma (,) between the phrase "other thing of value" and the words 
"or paying for any services...." To construe "obtaining" and "paying" as two separate 
purposes, as the trial court did, is incorrect for at least two reasons. First, that 
interpretation suggests that services are not to be included in the phrase "other thing of 
value," and second it suggests a major change in the elements and rationale of the statute 
where services are concerned. There is no legislative history to suggest such a change, 
nor is it reasonable to say that the legislature did not believe services were a "thing of 
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value." 
The Utah Supreme Court in Pfannenstiel treated the addition of the language "or 
wages for labor performed" as a "clarification" of the phrase "for the payment of money" 
in the 1965 amendments to § 76-6-505. 448 P.2d at 347. Similarly, the fact that there is 
no comma between the phrase "other thing of value" and the words "or paying for any 
services..." suggests that these are not separate clauses. Thus, like Pfannenstiel the 
phrase "or paying for any services..." should be treated as though it were part of the 
phrase "other thing of value," i.e., a clarification of that phrase and not an alternative to 
it. That interpretation preserves the integrety of the statute as one that requires two 
elements {see State v. Smith cited above). A person convicted of this offense must have 
(a) passed a bad check, and (b) they must have done so for the purpose of "obtaining" 
some "thing of value," including services. 
C. The "Obtaining" Element Is Necessary In Order To Avoid A Due Process 
Violation. 
If one does away with the "obtaining" requirement only in cases where bad checks 
are written for services and not where they are written for goods, it creates an unexpected 
dichotomy between bad checks written to pay for goods and bad checks written to pay for 
services. That dichotomy can confuse law enforcement officials and surprise citizens. As 
indicated in the AOB, this raises a constitutional Due Process issue. See State v. 
Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D. 1980). 
As explained in Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Payne, 
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782 P.2d 464, 467 (Utah 1989) we may assume the legislature intended a fair result. 
Section 76-6-505(2) is a strict liability statute where the law does not ask if there is any 
good faith justification for a person's inability to make a check good in 14 days. In this 
respect, including use of the same identical "obtaining" language, § 7-15-1 is virtually 
identical to § 76-6-505(2). Without the obtaining element, the Mountain States court 
found § 7-15-1 unfair. Likewise, without an obtaining element, § 76-6-505(2) is unfair. 
In fact, it is even more so in the case of a criminal statute. It violates all concepts of 
fairness to impose criminal liability on a person who is not obtaining anything for 
themselves in the transaction. 
The State claims that Mr. Hopkins did obtain something, but it is incontrovertible 
that he did not. The prosecution made no claim at trial that he gained anything. R. 
184:201-202. He was issuing payroll checks on behalf of a corporation during a period of 
severe financial difficulty in an attempt to take care of the employees. The services had 
already been rendered, so there was no attempt in issuing the checks to induce Julie to do 
anything or to part with any of her services. Mr. Hopkins made sure the employees, 
including Julie, were fully aware of the financial problems. R. 184:165. Mr. Hopkins 
has no prior criminal history of any kind. These circumstances should not be included 
within the scope of this statute. The correct construction of the "obtaining" language 
would avoid this unfair result. 
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VL INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IS NOT AN ISSUE; AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, THE FINDINGS DO NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT. 
The State, in its "Point II" attempts to rebut a claim Mr. Hopkins never made, viz, 
"that under his interpretation of section 76-6-505(1), the evidence adduced at trial is 
insufficient to show his knowledge that checks 172 and 191 would not clear 
Cornerstone's account." The fact is that Mr. Hopkins never makes this claim because he 
doesn't have to. Nowhere does the trial court ever indicate that Mr. Hopkins knew 
"checks 172 and 191 would not clear Cornerstone's account." The lower court found that 
Mr. Hopkins knew "any given check may not be paid by the drawee." Mr. Hopkins has 
not challenged that finding. Accordingly, there is no need for him to marshal the 
evidence, since that is done for him by the trial court in arriving at its findings. Further, it 
is unnecessary for Mr. Hopkins to brief this argument. Mr. Hopkins merely asserts that 
the trial court's judgment finding him guilty of the offense is not supported by its own 
findings. That claim presents a legal question for this Court, not a challenge to the 
sufficiency of evidence. 
VII. SECTION 76-6-505(2) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, 
A. The Fourteen-Day Safe Haven In § 76-6-505(2) Renders It 
Unconstitutional Under the Equal Protection Clause. 
The AOB points out the problem with § 76-6-505(2) under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 76-6-505(2) establishes a safe haven that 
has nothing to do with preventing crime or discouraging the issuance of bad checks. 
Instead, it makes subsequent payment an affirmative defense. This turns the criminal 
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courts into collection agencies, and it establishes a classification based on wealth, where 
the poor issuer of bad checks is prosecuted while the rich issuer of bad checks is not. 
The State nowhere addresses these problems. By its failure to address the 
extensive arguments and authorities presented in the AOB, the State concedes that § 76-
6-505(2) is flawed under the U.S. Constitution. Rule 8(d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; see also Rule 7(b)(4). Accordingly, even if Mr. Hopkins's arguments 
regarding the "obtaining" language are not accepted by this Court, Mr. Hopkins's 
conviction under § 76-6-505(2) must be overturned. 
B. The Trial Court's Application Of § 76-6-505 Renders The Entire Statute 
Unconstitutional. 
Mr. Hopkins has argued that his Equal Protection objection to § 76-6-505(2) 
passes to the subsection (1) of the statute because of the way that portion of the statute 
was applied by the lower court. When the only persons prosecuted under the statute are 
those who do not make good on their bad checks, the crime becomes "one for failure to 
pay," raising serious constitutional issues. State v. Ohnstad, 392 N.W.2d 389, 391-92 
(N.D. 1986). That the lower court misapplied the statute is apparent from the fact that, as 
restitution, Mr. Hopkins was ordered to make the corporate payroll checks (the ones 
payable to Julie) good, and has taken every occasion to ensure that those checks are paid, 
including the threat of parole violation which arises from the restitution order. In practical 
terms, this means that, if Mr. Hopkins does not pay this corporate debt (even though he 
was not personally liable for it in the first place), he will be imprisoned, a situation which 
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clearly violates constitutional prohibitions. See, e.g., Utah Constitution, Article I, §16 
("There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of absconding debtors"). 
Again, the State provides no rebuttal to these arguments. 
C. Section 76-6-505 Is Unconstitutional Under Utah's Constitution, 
The State does attempt, however, to address the question of whether or not § 76-6-
505(1) violates Article I, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution, But its arguments are 
based entirely on a Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Mutnik, 406 A.2d 516 (Pa. 
1979), which upholds the constitutionality of a statute significantly different from Utah's 
§ 76-6-505. Unlike Utah, Pennsylvania has eliminated the "obtaining" element from its 
bad check statute. It makes it a crime to pass "a bad check knowing that it would be 
dishonored, regardless of consideration." 406 A.2d at 519 (emphasis added). Thus, the 
Pennsylvania statute focuses exclusively on the act of issuing the bad check. The Utah 
statute, instead, focuses on the total transaction. It requires that there be consideration— 
something that is obtained by the issuer of the bad check from the victim of the crime. 
Unlike the Pennsylvania statute, therefore, the Utah statute is susceptible to constitutional 
criticism when it is wrongly applied to punish the mere failure to pay a debt, as it was in 
this case. 
Nevertheless, the State seeks to have this Court follow the Pennsylvania case on 
the grounds that the legislative intent of the Utah statute is the same as that of the 
Pennsylvania statute, namely, to prevent individuals from "intentionally disrupting the 
flow of and undermining the soundness of commercial paper." AB pg. 24. This 
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argument is wholly inadequate in light of the significant differences between the two 
statutes. This is especially true where, as in this case, the checks were issued in payment 
of a pre-existing, corporate debt. See, Peterson Plumbing, supra; and Utah Constitution, 
Article I, §16, supra. 
D. Section 76-6-505 Is Void For Vagueness. 
Mr. Hopkins has argued that the Utah statute is void for vagueness because the 
obtaining language in both subsections is ambiguous. The State calls Mr. Hopkins's 
argument on this point "frivolous" (AB 25), but the problem with the complex and 
ambiguous obtaining language in § 76-6-505 is described perfectly in the State's own 
quotation from State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 927 (Utah App. 1991). The statutory 
wording is simply unclear. 
The State claims that the legislature intended to do away with the obtaining 
element of the offense in the case of payment for services. But the State's point without 
any support in case law. At the very least, the State's position should be supported by 
some statement from the legislative history, but it is not. Mr. Hopkins argues that the 
words "or paying for any services..." clarify the phrase "thing of value" in the statute. 
While the language appears clear enough when it is quoted by the State with the liberal 
use of ellipses (see AB pg 26), it is unclear when read in its entirety. If it is to be read as 
the lower court did, it does not provide adequate guidelines for either law enforcement or 
the average citizen, as this case demonstrates. The complex language expressing this 
element of the offense encourages "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" (id.), and 
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therefore, is constitutionally void for vagueness, as argued in the AOB. 
VIII. DISCLOSURE TO THE EMPLOYEES WAS A COMPLETE DEFENSE. 
The State claims Mr. Hopkins failed to adequately brief the issue of whether or not 
Mr. Hopkins' disclosure to the employees should have been a defense. That may be valid 
criticism. However, it is not one that will benefit the prosecution because the State 
acknowledges the defense and merely claims that it is flawed because it is not "absolute." 
AB 29. There is no question that this defense was raised in the trial court and has been 
adequately raised on appeal. The State's argument is that it is not "absolute" because it 
can be applied to only one of the two checks issued to Julie. 
That, however, is not the case. Utah Criminal Code § 76-2-307 states: 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in which an actor's criminal 
responsibility arises from his own conduct ... that prior to the commission of the 
offense, the actor voluntarily terminated his effort to promote or facilitate its 
commission and either: 
(1) gave timely warning to ... the intended victim; or 
(2) wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness in the commission. 
This provision of the code was specifically applied to a case under § 76-6-505 in 
State v. Smith, 571 P.2d 578 (Utah 1977). In that case, Mr. Hopkins claimed that this 
defense applied because he informed the payee that there were insufficient funds to cover 
the check. The facts of the Smith case clearly demonstrated that the disclosure to the 
payee in that case did not fall within the defense, but was part of the scheme to defraud 
the victim. However, the Smith case demonstrates that disclosing the insufficient basis of 
a check to the payee does, in fact, constitute the voluntary termination defense in a bad 
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check case, provided the disclosure is truthful and not simply part of the overall 
confidence scheme. 
That result is consistent with the case of State v. Trogstad, 100 P.2d 564 (Utah 
1940) which also involved a prosecution under the bad check statute. Although the 
elements of the offense were different at that time (they included the element of intent to 
defraud) the reasoning of the court is applicable to this case. In Trogstad, the defendant 
issued a check to a Mrs. E.O. Frakes for which there were insufficient funds. However, 
"Mrs. Frakes knew that there were no funds available for payment of the check 
immediately, when she received the $300 check, but that it was to be held for a few days 
until it was good." The Trogstad court interpreted this situation as follows: "In other 
words, Mrs. Frakes treated the check as a promise to pay in the future rather than as a 
check." On this basis, the conviction was reversed. 
This result is consistent with the situation in this case. Mr. Hopkins advised his 
employees, including Julie, of the problems with the checks. He told them that the 
checks could not be cashed at that time, but that they should be deposited in the 
employee's accounts and they would be made good in a few days when they reached the 
corporate account or otherwise, if necessary. R. 184:57-62. This was a warning to the 
"intended victims" that certainly vitiated any effort to commit a crime such as that 
described in § 76-6-505. 
The only opposition the State could muster to this defense was that the warning 
was supposedly not given to Julie in the case of the second check issued to her. AB 29. 
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Further examination of the record, however, reveals that Julie did not deny that she was 
personally told about the problems with both checks. R. 184:60. In addition, she 
admitted that she knew about the limited funds available to satisfy the check and to 
getting the word from the other employees with respect to the second check. R. 184:61. 
Since she does not recall anything to the contrary, Mr. Hopkins' testimony that he 
informed her and the other employees of all the problems is uncontested. R. 184:165. 
Accordingly, this defense, as the State implies, is absolute. The information given to 
Julie and the other employees did, in fact, constitute a voluntary termination defense. 
Further, Julie clearly understood the situation and accepted the checks as a promise to 
pay in the future, the same as in Trogstad. 
CONCLUSION 
To reiterate, the lower court made three fundamental errors in this case. It failed 
to find a mental state that fits the "knowing" requirement of § 76-6-505(1); it failed to 
include one of the two essential elements of the statute—the requirement that the checks 
be issued for the purpose of obtaining something of value (which includes services); and 
it failed to recognize Mr. Hopkins' disclosure to the employees as a voluntary termination 
defense under § 76-2-307. 
In addition, there are a number of constitutional problems with the statute. A Due 
Process problem is raised by the complex "obtaining" language. An Equal Protection 
4 There is nothing in the record cited by the State that supports its claim (AB 29) that "the 
trial court found Julie to be the more credible witness." 
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problem is raised by the fact that the second subpart of the statute raises issues of 
unfairness. There are problems with eliminating moral turpitude from the statute and 
misconstruing the "obtaining" language so that the statute applies to pre-existing debt. 
Finally, there are State Constitutional problems that bring to mind the horrors of debtor's 
prison. As noted, if this Court finds in favor of Mr. Hopkins on the first three defenses, it 
is possible to decide this case without reaching the constitutional issues. 
However, in light of the weakness of the trial court's findings of fact with regard 
to § 76-6-505(1) and the State's failure to address the constitutional problem raised by § 
76-6-505(2), Mr. Hopkins' conviction must be overturned. 
DATED this J L l day of April 2003. 
Blake T. Qstler 
Attorney for Appellant, Mr. Hopkins 
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